Karl Wennberg, Johan Wiklund, Karin Hellerstedt, and Mattias Nordqvist · 2011 · Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 352-372
Two different things are being measured, and conflating them is how owners talk themselves into the wrong decision. Performance and survival are not the same objective. A business handed to the next generation is more likely to still exist; a business sold to an outsider is more likely to do well. The authors attribute the difference to the long-term orientation families carry into the next generation, and to the willingness of an outside acquirer to bear uncertainty in the expectation of improving something.
The uncomfortable implication is that the family pool of managerial talent is small by construction. You are choosing a successor from a group of perhaps three people who happen to be related to you, against a buyer who was selected from a market. That is not a judgment about any particular child; it is arithmetic, and it deserves to be said out loud before a succession is decided by default.
The paper is also candid about why buying a family firm is hard, which cuts the other way for readers on the buy side. Much of what makes such a business work is tacit and sits with the family, so formal diligence will not surface it. The authors treat acquirers of closely held family firms as bearers of genuine uncertainty, entrepreneurial in the same sense as founders.
This is Swedish data, and succession norms, tax treatment and family structures differ by country, so treat the direction of the finding as more portable than its magnitude. It also sits in tension with the seller-side literature elsewhere on this shelf that treats a sale as the natural completion of the entrepreneurial process: here, the intra-family route buys something real, just not performance.